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Defendant and Appellee, Enterprise Rent-A-Car ("Enterprise") respectfully submits the 
following Brief of Appellee Enterprise Rent-A-Car. References to statutes will be to the Utah Code 
Annotated unless otherwise indicated. 
I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Statement of the Issues 
1. Does the plain language of §31A-22-314(1) require Enterprise to provide coverage 
for Plaintiff when there was other "valid and collectible insurance"? 
a. Standard of Review: Correctness. Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 
942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997). 
b. Record: pages 38-96 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
1. §31 A-22-314(1) reads: 
(1) A rental company shall provide its renters with primary coverage meeting the requirements 
of Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators 
Act, unless there is other valid and collectible insurance coverage. 
2. §41-12a-301(2)(a) reads: 
(a) every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or operator's 
security in effect at any time that the motor vehicle is operated on a highway within 
the state; 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car rented a vehicle to Beizhong Li. At the time of the rental, Mr. Li had 
in force a valid and collectible insurance policy with uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage 
from GEICO. Defendant Shuyu Zhang had in force a valid and collectible policy of insurance with 
liability coverage with American Commerce Insurance Company. ("American"). On July 21,2000 
Mr. Li and Defendant Shuyu Zhang were involved in a motor vehicle accident which resulted in the 
death of Mr. Li. Mr. Zhang was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 
The Estate of Mr. Li settled for the policy limit of the American policy (i.e. $100,000), and 
for the full coverage of the GEICO uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits. The Estate of Mr. 
Li requested from Enterprise additional liability coverage under the theory that §31A-22-314(l) 
required Enterprise to provide an additional $25,000 in "secondary" or "excess" liability coverage 
despite the fact that there was other "valid and collectible insurance" available to Mr. Li's estate. 
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed addressing this issue and the Honorable Timothy 
Hansen granted Enterprise's motion and dismissed Enterprise from the lawsuit. Plaintiff has set forth 
the applicable language of Judge Hansen's ruling. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 20,2000, Beizhong Li executed a Rental Agreement with Enterprise for the 
rental of a Ford Taurus. (R. at 42, 58). 
2. The Rental Agreement specifically offered Mr. Li the option of personal accident 
coverage and supplemental liability coverage. Mr. Li initialed the boxes on the Rental Agreement 
declining both coverages. (R. at 59). 
3. Mr. Li further explicitly accepted responsibility for any damage to the vehicle. (R. at 
59). 
4. At the time of the motor vehicle accident, Mr. Li had in force a policy of uninsured 
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motorist coverage with GEICO Indemnity Company with a limit of $100,000 applicable to this 
accident. Mr. Li also had in force a policy of underinsured motorist benefits from GEICO with a limit 
of $100,000 applicable to this accident. (R. at 59). 
5. Mr. Li settled with GEICO for the full value of the uninsured motorist benefits and 
for the full value of the underinsured motorist benefits. (Appellant's Brief at 5). 
6. In addition to the GEICO policy, the driver of the Taurus, Shuyu Zhang, had in force 
a liability policy with American with a limit of $100,000. (R. at 43, 59). 
7. Subsequent to executing the Rental Agreement, Mr. Li was tragically killed in a motor 
vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in the vehicle rented from Enterprise. At the time of the 
accident, Mr. Shuyu Zhang was operating the vehicle. (R. at 42, 52-55, 59). 
8. Following the accident, the Estate of Beizhong Li settled with American for the full 
value of the liability limit. (Appellant's Brief at 5). 
9. Enterprise is self insured. (R. at 43, 50). 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The plain language of §31A-22-314(1) exempts Enterprise from providing the coverage 
required in §41-12a-301(2)(a) because there was "other valid or collectible insurance". 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: 
§31A-22-314(l) Exempts Enterprise from Providing Liability Coverage in this Case 
Because There was "Other Valid or Collectible Insurance" available to Mr. Li 
Enterprise does not dispute that §41-12a-301(2)(a) requires owner's or operator's of motor 
vehicles from providing liability coverage. Enterprise does not dispute that Shuyu Zhang is an insured 
3 
under the defmilion of §31 A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A). The only dispute is whether the plain language of 
§31A-22-314(l) provides an exception to this rule when there is "other valid or collectible 
insurance". 
In the present case, there is no dispute that there was, in fact, "other valid or collectible 
insurance". Mr. Li had UM and UIM coverage under his own policy with GEICO and Mr. Zhang 
had a valid policy with American with liability coverage. In fact, the Estate of Mr. Li has collected 
$300,000 (collectively) from these three policies. Thus, there can be no dispute about whether there 
was "other valid or collectible insurance". 
The dispute in this case centers around the interpretation of the word "primary" in §31A-22-
314(1). Plaintiff contends that the inclusion of this word in this section necessarily means that 
Enterprise is not excused from all obligations to provide liability coverage when there is "other valid 
or collectible insurance" only that it relieves Enterprise of the obligation to provide "primary" 
coverage. Enterprise, on the other hand, takes the position that the plain language of this statute is 
clear, that its obligation to provide liability coverage exists only when there is no other "valid or 
collectible insurance." This was the issue presented to the trial court and is the only issue presented 
to the appellate court. 
When interpreting a statute, Utah courts first look to the plain language of the statute. If the 
meaning of the statute is clear from the plain language of the statute, then there is no need to look 
any further. In this case, the plain meaning of the statute is clear when the provision is read in its 
entirety. The meaning posited by Enterprise is that a rental company has no obligation to provide 
liability coverage when the renter has "other valid or collectible insurance." In State v. Coonce. 36 
P.3d 533, 537 (Utah App. 2001) (citations omitted) this Court stated: 
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A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed 
according to their plain language. Only if the language of a statute is ambiguous do 
we resort to other modes of construction. Furthermore, unambiguous language may 
not be interpreted to contradict its plain language. A corollary of this rule is that a 
"statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is 
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute". 
It has always been the position of Enterprise that the plain language of this statute was intended to 
ensure that rental companies complied with Title 41, Chapter 12a and ensured minimum liability 
coverage on all of their vehicles. Thus, if a person rents a vehicle owned by Enterprise and they do 
not have "valid or collectible insurance", then Enterprise would be required under the statute to step 
in and provide primary liability coverage. However, when there is other valid and collectible 
insurance available to the renter, then this statutes exempts Enterprise (and other rental agencies) 
from the need to provide minimum liability limits. This interpretation furthers the fundamental 
requirement of Title 41, Chapter 12a by ensuring that all vehicles on Utah roads - even those owned 
by rental agencies - have the minimum requirements for liability insurance. 
Plaintiffs interpretation of this statute, however, writes unintended meaning and language into 
the statute. In fact, Plaintiffs meaning runs afoul of the plain language of the statute and requires 
rental companies to provide coverage despite the fact that "other valid or collectible insurance" is 
available. The use of the word"unless" in this statute suggests Plaintiff s intended meaning runs afoul 
of the statute; this word is clearly intended to excuse Enterprise from providing liability coverage 
when there is other valid or collectible insurance. According to Coonce, so long as the meaning 
posited by Enterprise is not "unreasonably confused", "inoperable" or a "blatant contradiction" of the 
express purpose of the statute, then there is no need to add the meaning and language suggested by 
5 
Plaintiff. 
Courts must "avoid adding to or deleting from statutory language, unless absolutely necessary 
to make it a rational statute." Luckauv. Board of Reg., 840 P.2d 811,815 (Utah App. 1992). In 
the present case, Plaintiff s suggested meaning would require this court to add meaning and language. 
The statute does not employ the words "secondary" or "excess" and yet Plaintiff wants this court to 
interpret this statute to require Enterprise to assume a "secondary" or "excess" position even when 
there is other insurance. This additional language and meaning is inappropriate because, according 
to Luckau, it is not "absolutely necessary to make it a rational statute." The trial Court agreed with 
this proposition and was unwilling to add the meaning and language suggested by Plaintiff. If the 
legislature intended rental agencies to assume a "secondary" or "excess" position, it would have been 
easy for the legislature to make that responsibility clear by adding a few additional words to this 
provision. 
§41-12a-301(2)(a) clearly requires Enterprise to provide liability coverage, but §31A-22-
314(1) carves out an exception for rental companies, like Enterprise, when there is other insurance 
available. This meaning is consistent with the purpose of Title 41, Chapter 12a in that it ensures that 
every vehicle on Utah roads has the required minimum amounts of liability coverage. The statute is 
clear on its face and there is no need to add meaning or language to make it rational. 
Plaintiffs position is that this statute is ambiguous and, as a result, a resort to legislative 
history is needed and appropriate. See State v. Germonto, 2003 Utah App 217 ^ 7,73 P.2d 978 ("We 
consider other methods of statutory construction only when a statute is ambiguous.")(Emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). However, even if the statute was ambiguous and resort to legislative 
history is needed, Plaintiff has still not shown that the legislature intended rental companies to be 
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"secondary" or "excess" carriers. In fact, the legislative history Plaintiff cited only shows - if 
anything- that the legislature intended to use the word "primary". This legislative history is 
absolutely silent regarding whether the legislature intended rental agencies to assume "secondary" or 
"excess" positions. In fact, there is nothing in the language of the cited legislative history to suggest 
that our legislature intended rental agencies to assume "secondary", "excess", or "UIM-like" 
obligations. The legislative history cited by Plaintiff/Appellant does nothing more than illustrate that 
the word "primary" was added to the statute. However, that does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion suggested by Plaintiff. 
Enterprise does not dispute that the word "primary" should be given meaning; however, 
Enterprise disputes Plaintiffs contention that the only meaning attached to this word is that 
Enterprise is obliged to provide "secondary" or "excess" coverage. 
Plaintiff is suggesting that the only conclusion that can be reached from the use of this word 
is that the legislature intended rental companies to assume a "secondary" or "excess" position when 
other valid or collectible insurance is insufficient to compensate an injured party. This argument is 
based on the unfounded assumption that because the legislature used the word "primary" a rental 
company is not excused from all coverage, only that they need not provide "primary" coverage. 
Plaintiffs position is flawed. First, if the legislature truly intended to simply subordinate the rental 
company's obligation to a "secondary" position, then they would have made that clear in the statute. 
The legislature would have included language explaining that when there is insufficient coverage from 
the primary carrier, then the rental company would have to step and provide "secondary" coverage. 
This could have been accomplished by adding a few additional words to the statute. The legislature 
did not do that here. Plaintiff is asking this Court to improperly add language and meaning to this 
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statute. 
Second, what Plaintiff is asking this court to do is re-write the insurance code. In essence, 
Plaintiff is asking this Court to require Enterprise to act as a de facto underinsured motorist carrier. 
Plaintiff s argument is that because there is insufficient liability coverage from American, Enterprise 
should step in and pay (up to the state required minimum of $25,000) the deficiency. This is the very 
purpose of UIM coverage. Again, if the legislature intended rental companies to have UIM-like 
obligations, they would have made this obligation clear, either in this provision or another provision 
in the statute. 
Third, the "legislative history" cited by Plaintiff does not necessarily lead one to the 
conclusion posited by Plaintiff. The word "primary" has other, more reasonable meanings when read 
in the proper context. Plaintiffs argument is that "primary" and "other insurance" are related, but 
that does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended rental companies to have "secondary" 
liability under these circumstances. The word "primary" has other, more reasonable meanings when 
this statute is read in the proper context. 
For example, the legislature could have used the term "primary coverage" in reference to a 
situation where there was other valid or collectible insurance available, but that coverage did not meet 
the statutory minimum of $25,000. Arguably, the rental company would be obliged in that situation 
to provide "primary" coverage sufficient to satisfy Title 41, Chapter 12a. Supposing, that the liability 
limit on the American policy had been $15,000 rather than $100,000, Enterprise may have been 
obliged to step in and provide "primary" coverage sufficient to meet the $25,000 minimum required 
by Title 41, Chapter 12a. Under this assumed set of facts, Enterprise would have had a "primary" 
obligation to the amount of the $ 10,000 shortfall. Such a scenario suggests that the legislature could 
8 
have intended the word "primary" to mean something entirely different than what Plaintiff is 
suggesting. 
The shortfall example comports well with the disputed liability provision the legislature 
adopted in §31 A-22-305(2)(c). In that section, if a third party liability carrier disputes liability for 
more than 60 days, then the vehicle becomes "uninsured" for purposes of the statute. The insurer of 
the owner or operator will then have to provide "primary" uninsured motorist coverage. This 
"primary" obligation on the part of the operator's insurer does not mean that such an insurer is 
"secondary" when liability is disputed. The operator's insurer has no liability, "secondary," "excess," 
or otherwise for uninsured motorist coverage until the specific statutory trigger of a 61 day dispute 
is met and the vehicle is deemed uninsured. 
Likewise, under §31 A-22-305(2)(d), a vehicle becomes "uninsured" under the statute if the 
insurer of an insured vehicle is found insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction. Again, the 
owner's or operator's insurer will step in and pay "primary" uninsured motorist coverage. The 
legislature could easily have been considering such scenarios when it referred to "primary coverage" 
in §31A-22-314(1), without intending that rental agencies assume "secondary" or, in the alternative, 
UIM-like obligations. 
These examples provide rational and reasonable explanations for why the legislature used the 
word "primary" in the statute. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs position, there are other reasons why the 
legislature may have used the word "primary" in the statute that have nothing to do with providing 
"secondary" of "excess" coverage. This being the case, the word "primary" was not overlooked or 
ignored by Enterprise or by the trial court; rather the lower court and Enterprise were simply 
unwilling to add language to this statute and attached different meanings to the word "primary". 
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Plaintiff also argued (for the first time on appeal) that if the legislature were attempting to 
draft an "escape clause", they would have drafted it using language similar to §31 A-22-303(2)(a)(iii) 
and (iv). In other words, because the legislature did not employ the specific language in §§31A-22-
303(2)(a)(iii) and (iv) then this provision must not be an "escape clause". There are several flaws 
with this reasoning. 
First, Plaintiff has not provided any definition for the term "escape clause". Notwithstanding 
this omission, the plain language of this provision is clearly intended to either relieve or strictly limit 
the liability of rental companies when there is other valid and collectible insurance. Thus, the 
provision is clearly an "escape clause" because it is relieving or limiting companies from providing 
coverage under certain circumstances. 
Second, simply because the legislature used different language in §31A-22-314(1) does not 
mean that it is not an "escape clause". There is no rule that requires the legislature to use the exact 
same language in every "escape" provision. The plain import of §31 A-22-314(1) is that rental 
companies have no obligation to provide coverage under certain circumstances — whatever words 
were employed by the legislature, that meaning cannot be escaped. In sum, the fact that the 
legislature used different language does not prove that the legislature did not intend to provide an 
"escape" for rental companies under these set of facts. 
Enterprise does not dispute that Utah law applies; in fact, this was conceded to the trial court. 
Regarding Point I of Plaintiff s brief, that argument is addressed by the arguments above. That is, 
if the language is interpreted as suggested by Enterprise, then §31 A-22-314(1) carves out an 
exception to the requirements found in §41 -12a-301 (2)(A). Thus, whether Mr. Li is an insured under 
the code is not relevant because §31 A-22-314(1) provides an exception to coverage. Similarly, 
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Plaintiffs Point III is addressed by the arguments above. If there is no obligation to provide 
insurance because of this statutory exception, then Enterprise has no obligation at all to pay Mr. Li. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the plain language of §31A-22-314(1) relieves Enterprise from providing coverage 
to the Estate of Mr. Li in this case because there was "other valid or collectible insurance" available 
to him at the time of loss. This statute is clear on its face. Defendant/Appellee requests that this 
court affirm the trial court's finding and vacate this appeal. 
No Addendum in required under URAP 24(A)(11). 
Defendant/Appellee should be awarded his costs for this appeal. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 2004. 
Defendant/Appellee 
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